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Cynthia M. Ohlenforst * and Jeff W. Dorrill **
I. LIMITED SALES, EXCISE, AND USE TAX
A. Application of the Tax
HE courts decided few sales tax cases during the survey period,
although several significant sales tax cases were pending at the close
of the survey period,' and others remain subject to further judicial
review.2 The taxpayer-corporation in Reveille Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Texas 3
had filed articles of dissolution with the Secretary of State in December
1982, the month after the corporation had requested that the comptroller
redetermine a deficiency determination. Pursuant to the comptroller's rede-
termination, tax became due and payable on September 25, 1984. On Janu-
ary 31, 1986, the state filed suit to recover taxes. The taxpayer argued that
the suit had been filed more than three years from the date of the corpora-
tion's dissolution, and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.4
The court held, however, that the state had commenced an administrative
"proceeding" within three years of the dissolution and thus had satisfied the
statutory requirement that an action or "other proceeding" commence
within three years of dissolution.5
The United States Supreme Court's decision in D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v.
McNamera6 may have broad Texas sales and use tax implications. In
Holmes the Court upheld Louisiana's imposition of use tax on catalogues for
D.H. Holmes department store.7 Although out-of-state companies prepared
and mailed the catalogues, eighty-two percent of the catalogues were mailed
to Louisiana residents. The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]here is nexus
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
1. E.g., Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Bullock, No. 2-88-079-CV (Tex. App.-Austin) (not yet
reported) (concerning the taxability of certain "handling" charges with respect to catalog
sales).
2. See, e.g., Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 890, 102 L. Ed.2d (1989) (concerning exemption for reli-
gious periodical under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982)). Subsequent to the
survey period, the Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, struck down the Texas statute as
unconstitutional.
3. 756 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
4. See TEX. Bus. CORP. CODE ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
5. 756 S.W.2d at 103.
6. 108 S. Ct. 1619, 100 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1988).
7. 108 S. Ct. at 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 25.
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aplenty here," and distinguished Holmes from the landmark National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.8
Several administration decisions focus on issues that are likely to recur
both in their original context and in the context of the Texas sales tax as it
applies to services. Decision 21,970,9 for example, which deals with the tax-
ability of rental receipts on floating buildings, addressed issues that also arise
in determining which services are related to real property.' 0 This decision
distinguished real property from personal property and concluded that the
buildings were nontaxable real property. The decision indicated that while
the intention of the parties is the most important factor, objective factors
such as the method by which property is attached to real property also re-
quired consideration. "
Other administrative decisions evidence the difficulty of allocating only a
portion of a purchase price to a taxable sale. Decision 21,868,12 for example,
discussed at some length the proper criteria for determining which charges
were allocable to taxable scaffold erecting and which charges were allocable
to nontaxable dismantling. 13 Decision 21,837 14 distinguished a sale of tangi-
ble property from a sale of intangible information, and concluded that a pur-
chaser of coupon books buys the tangible coupons rather than the
information represented by the books.' 5 Decision 22,54216 emphasized lit-
eral statutory language and concluded that tax should be imposed only on
the "performance" of a taxable service.' 7 In addition, the decision con-
cluded that a cable company's customer deposits were not charges for the
performance of a service and were therefore not taxable.' 8
Decision 21,82619 addressed the prerequisites for the grandfather protec-
tion afforded certain transactions by 1984 legislative changes. 20 In a deci-
8. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
9. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,970 (Feb. 17, 1988).
10. See Comptroller Hearing No. 21,788 (May 31, 1988) (concluding that specified equip-
ment used in bowling alley was real rather than personal property). Decision 21,788 is also
interesting for its observation that the Tax Division had altered its position on the classification
of bowling equipment. Id. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 21,177 (Sept. 23, 1987)
(cooler/freezer units were improvements to realty); Comptroller Hearing No. 21,689 (Mar. 14,
1988) (floor-to-ceiling wall systems were personal rather than real property, and labor charges
allocable to installation were not separately stated; therefore, charges were taxable).
11. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,970 (Feb. 17, 1988).
12. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,868 (July 29, 1988) (this decision discusses detrimental
reliance).
13. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 22,613 (May 12, 1988) (portion of membership cost
in video rental store that does not entitle member to tapes is nontaxable); Comptroller Hearing
22,414 (June 9, 1988) (discussing "hybrid" transactions and reiterating that "essence of the
transaction" test is proper test for determining whether certain sales are taxable).
14. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,837 (Dec. 10, 1987).
15. Id. The administrative law judge distinguished this situation from the sale of key
punch cards, by which the purchaser buys information.
16. Comptroller Hearing No. 22,542 (June 15, 1988) (relying on the TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.005(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988) definition of taxable service as "the performance of a
taxable service").
17. Comptroller Hearing No. 22,542 (June 15, 1988).
18. Id.
19. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,826 (May 23, 1988).
20. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.339 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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sion that the comptroller may attempt to rely on in interpreting more recent
grandfather provisions, 21 the administrative law judge concluded that a
seller whose contract allowed it to adjust charges after six months was un-
able to qualify for grandfather protection. 22 According to the decision, the
contract was subject to change or modification by reason of the tax, and "it
mattered not that the taxpayer elected not to change the contract. ' 23
Decisions 21,52524 and 21,31425 both addressed agency issues. In Deci-
sion 21,525 the taxpayer sought credit for a tax payment made by its parent
corporation, on the grounds that the parent was acting as taxpayer's agent.
The administrative law judge found, however, that the parent was not sub-
ject to the taxpayer's control and was therefore not its agent.26 The taxpayer
in Decision 21,31427 denied tax liability on the grounds that it made
purchases as an agent for its customer, and that agents should not be held
liable for sales tax. The decision concluded, however, that the sales tax was
transactional and applied not to the ultimate owner but to the person actu-
ally involved in the sale or purchase,28 and that the agency issue, therefore,
was meaningless. 29
As in most recent survey periods the comptroller decided numerous deci-
sions on the "sixty-day rule,"' 30 which requires resale certificates to be timely
submitted to the comptroller during audit. As in the past, the comptroller
generally ruled against the taxpayer, but the decisions raised some interest-
ing issues. 31 Other decisions emphasize the broad liability of taxpayers, 32
21. See Act of July 21, 1987, ch. 5, 2d Called Session, Tex. Session Law Serv. 20 (Vernon)
(exemption until July 1, 1990 from rate increase for certain sales pursuant to prior contract);
Act of July 21, 1987, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 43 (Vernon) (exemption until Jan. 1, 1990 from tax
on certain sales of services pursuant to prior contract).
22. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,826 (May 23, 1988).
23. Id. See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (eff. Apr. 1, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1340)
which sets forth comptroller's rules with respect to prior contract exemptions and includes a
form for claiming a prior contract exemption.
24. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,525 (Mar. 24, 1988).
25. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,314 (Apr. 5, 1988).
26. Decision 21,525 cites First National Bank of Mineola v. Farmers & Merchants State
Bank of Athens, 417 S.W.2d 317, 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) as
authority for the "control" test. The comptroller's refusal to recognize an agency relationship
in this situation may be inconsistent with attempts by some auditors to impute business activi-
ties of one entity to another to establish doing business in Texas for franchise tax purposes.
27. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,314 (April 5, 1988).
28. Id.
29. The decision therefore held that one who is the de facto purchaser of a taxable item,
or pays consideration for the item, and "whose only defense against the tax is simply that he
was an agent, can be held liable for any tax shown to be due." Id. (emphasis in original).
30. See, Comptroller Hearing No. 21,321 (Nov. 9, 1987) (comptroller is without authority
to extend 60 day period and cannot be estopped by actions of his agents). But see Comptroller
Hearing No. 22,423 (May 12, 1988) (auditor's sending final determination to taxpayer prior to
expiration of 60 days disrupted 60-day time frame so that taxpayer was not given requisite 60
days).
31. See, Comptroller Hearing No. 22,924 (July 20, 1988) (60 day period not tolled by
bankruptcy proceeding).
32. See Comptroller Hearings No. 22,538 (Apr. 20, 1988) and 21,709 (Sept. 4, 1987) (find-
ing taxpayers liable under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.613 (repealed 1988) for tax liability of
predecessors). The successor liability provision under current law is broader than in 1982. See
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (extends not only to sales taxes, but
1989]
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the difficulty of determining what constitutes an occasional sale,33 and the
continuing uncertainty over what constitutes an assignment of a lease for
sales tax purposes. 34 Several administrative cases set forth the standards for
proving that a taxpayer has relied to its detriment on advice from the
comptroller.35
B. Administrative Developments
The comptroller issued significant new rules and revised numerous ex-
isting rules during the survey period. Many of these rules focus on the re-
cently enacted sales tax on the following services. 36
Amusement Services. The comptroller's rule regarding amusement services 37
gives numerous examples of taxable amusement services, ranging from ballet
performances to zoos. It notes that amusement services are taxable whether
live or recorded, whether purchased individually or by season tickets, and
whether spectator or participatory. 38 The rule now specifically discusses
both dues and initiation fees for country club memberships, 39 and lists exam-
also to franchise and other taxes under Title 2 of the Texas Tax Code). See also Comptroller
Hearing No. 21,983 (June 7, 1988) (taxpayer paid tax voluntarily without receiving deficiency
determination or otherwise being assessed, so statute of limitations with respect to assessment
was not bar to comptroller's collecting tax; certain of taxpayer's refund claims, however, were
barred by statute of limitations).
33. See Comptroller Hearing No. 20,955 (May 6, 1988) (taxpayer's sale qualified as single
transaction to single purchaser for purposes of meeting occasional sale requirements of 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d)(4) (eff. Dec. 24, 1984, 19 Tex. Reg. 6188) notwithstanding fact
that transfers took several months to accomplish); Comptroller Hearing No. 19,280 (Dec. 16,
1987) (transfer of assets between sister corporations did not qualify under occasional sale ex-
ception for transfers in which ultimate ownership remains "substantially similar"). See also 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(e)(2) (eff. Dec. 24, 1984, 9 Tex. Reg. 6188), and TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.304(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
34. Pursuant to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE, § 3.294 (eff. Dec. 5, 1984, 9 Tex. Reg. 6017), if a
lease is factored or assigned (but not merely as collateral), tax on all remaining lease payments
becomes due. Compare Comptroller Hearing No. 21,915 (June 10, 1988) (assignment of leases
as collateral did not result in acceleration of tax, relying on Bullock v. Citizens National Bank
of Waco, 663 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ)) with Comptroller Hearing No.
21,755 (Dec. 1, 1987) (assignment did result in acceleration). See also Comptroller Hearing
No. 21,396 (Jan. 6, 1987) (discussing rationale underlying acceleration).
35. See e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 21,248 (Mar. 22, 1988) (comptroller's representa-
tive understood situation and offered advice, which was followed by taxpayer; taxpayer's liabil-
ity nonetheless held not to be directly tied to auditor's advice, since taxpayer could have
restructured transactions regardless of auditor's comments); Comptroller Hearing No. 20,612
(Mar. 24, 1988) (taxpayer relied to its detriment on written advice from comptroller and was
entitled to relief for periods prior to issuance of letter to industry by comptroller). Both deci-
sions cite Comptroller Decision No. 14,541 (Sept. 20, 1985) which requires a taxpayer to show
that (1) it relied on erroneous advice of comptroller employee, (2) the employee had knowledge
of the facts sufficient to have enabled him to give correct information, (3) the taxpayer subse-
quently acted in accordance with advice, and (4) the taxpayer suffered harm by following
advice. Id.
36. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxation, 42 Sw. L.J. 633,
636-644 (1988) for a description of recent legislative changes affecting sales of services in
Texas. This article also describes the regulatory guidance on these taxes that was issued dur-
ing the months immediately preceding this survey period.
37. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298 (eff. May 26, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2252).
38. Id. § 3.298(a)(7).
39. Id. § 3.298(a)(1)(G). See 12 Tex. Reg. 3624 for the emergency rule regarding amuse-
ment services that first added the specific reference to country clubs.
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pies of services that are not amusement services or are exempt from the
tax.4° The sale of ten or fewer admissions during a twelve-month period
constitutes an occasional sale if the person selling the admissions does not
regularly sell or hold himself out as selling.41 Although the Tax Code does
not exempt from tax a charity event that is co-sponsored by a non-exempt
entity,4 2 a nonprofit group may hire a for-profit organization to produce an
event without losing the exemption.43
Credit Reporting Service. The final version of the comptroller's rule on
credit reporting services" continues to define credit reporting services as
broadly as did prior versions of the rule. 45 The rule thus includes "[a]ny
written, oral, or other compilation of any credit history or other information
bearing on a person's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or
insurability."' 46 The rule specifically includes compilations of medical
information. 47
Data Processing. Significant confusion continues to exist regarding what
constitutes taxable data processing. According to the final version of the
comptroller's rule on data processing,48 data processing includes "processing
of information for the purpose of compiling and producing records... main-
taining information, and entering and retrieving information. '49 The rule
specifically includes word processing, payroll, and other computerized data
and information storage,50 and it specifically excludes several services, in-
cluding the preparation of tax returns by accountants. 5' Taxpayers and the
comptroller undoubtedly will disagree about the treatment of the vast array
of services covered by this rule. The services of a management company, for
example, often include a substantial data processing component, and no
clear line exists to separate taxable data processing services rendered to the
buyer in conjunction with the management services from data processing
services that, like secretarial services, the seller uses in providing manage-
ment services.
40. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298(a)(2) (includes hobby clubs and hunting leases).
41. Id. § 3.298(a)(3).
42. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3101 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
43. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298(g)(3).
44. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.343 (eff. Mar. 21, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1193).
45. See 12 Tex. Reg. 3628 (emergency rule § 3.343, adopted Sept. 30, 1987).
46. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.343(a)(1).
47. Id.
48. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (eff. June 16, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2753).
49. Id. § 3.330(a).
50. Id.
51. Id. The rule provides that:
[d]ata processing does not include the use of a computer by a provider of other
services when the computer is used to facilitate the performance of the service or
the application of the knowledge of accounting principals [sic] and tax laws, e.g.,
the use of a computer by a C.P.A. firm, enrolled agents, or bookkeeping firm to
produce a financial report, prepare federal income tax, state franchise or sales
tax returns, or charges for temporary secretarial personnel who as part of their
function use word processing equipment.
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Debt Collection Services. The language enacted by the legislature regarding
debt collection, 52 like the language dealing with data processing, 53 requires
substantial administrative interpretation. The comptroller defined debt col-
lection services as including any activity, for consideration, to collect or ad-
just a debt or a claim or to repossess property subject to a "claim."' 54 The
comptroller defined "claim" as extending to, inter alia, an alleged right for
money or property, whether the claimed obligation is actual or contingent. 5"
Information Services. The current version of the relevant administrative
rule 56 defines information services in language that essentially tracks the
statute.57 The rule specifies that information may be provided by virtually
any medium. 58 In an effort to distinguish information services from other
taxable services, the rule provides that "[p]rocessing, reformatting or manip-
ulation of data provided by the customer. .." is data processing and not
information services. 59 Unfortunately, the line between data processing and
information services remains blurred in practice. Like prior versions of this
rule,6° the final version provides examples of taxable services6' and of non-
taxable services. 62
Insurance Services. The relevant administrative rule63 defines each of the six
components of insurance services that the statute" lists, and provides that
any of those activities "performed on behalf of an insurance carrier, its in-
52. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0035 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
53. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
54. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354(a)(4).
55. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354(a)(1) (eft. Mar. 24, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1222).
Although the comptroller indicated at one time that debt collection might even include the
collection of non-delinquent debts, e.g., by a mortgage company, the adopted rule excludes
collection of current credit and real estate accounts. Id. § 3.354(b)(2).
56. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342 (eff. Mar. 25, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1192).
57. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0038 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
58. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342(a)(2). The rule includes information provided "by
printed, mimeographed, electronic, or electrical transmission, or by utilizing wires, cable, radio
waves, microwaves, satellites, fiber optics, or any other method now in existence or which may
be devised." Id.
59. Id. § 3.342(a)(1) (Lexis and Westlaw are taxable).
60. See 12 Tex. Reg. 4769 (§ 3.342 as proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
61. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342(b). Mailing lists, real estate listings, financial and
bond rating reports are among the examples of taxable services.
62. Id. § 3.342(d)(1). Information on behalf of a particular client that "is of a proprietary
nature to that client and may not be sold to others by the person who gathered or compiled the
information," e.g., opinion polls and management consultant reports, is nontaxable. Id. Per-
haps the emphasis accorded opinion polls in recent elections will prompt Texas legislators or
administrators to revisit their decision to exempt such polls from tax. Spokespersons in the
comptroller's office have indicated verbally that information services could technically include
giving bank account balances to bank customers, although providing such information is not
currently considered taxable. A prior version of the rule also listed certain medical records
and reports as taxable information services. 12 Tex. Reg. 3627 (emerg. rule § 3.342(e)(4),
adopted Sept. 30, 1987). The final rule, however, specifies that sales of information primarily
derived from laboratory, medical or exploratory testing or experimentation, including medical
test results, are not taxable. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342(d).
63. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355 (eff. Mar. 24, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1224).
64. Id. § 3.355(b). The statute includes as insurance service "[1] insurance loss or damage
appraisal, [2] insurance inspection, [3] insurance investigation, [4] insurance actuarial analysis
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sured, its policyholders, or others pertaining to a policy or policies of insur-
ance for monetary fees, dues or other consideration are taxable."' 65 The rule
defines insurance carrier as including any insurer who is or is required to be
licensed or to operate under the provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.
66
The rule excludes certain services from taxable insurance services, including
insurance coverage for which a premium is paid or sales commissions paid to
an agent. 67 The rule also excludes medical services and certain automobile
service contracts.
68
Real Property Repair and Remodeling. By imposing Texas sales tax on real
property repair and remodeling services,69 the legislature made the line be-
tween real and personal property more critical, and required a determination
of what constitutes "repair and remodeling" as opposed to maintenance or
new construction. The final version of the comptroller's rule70 regarding
these services differs in several respects from prior versions of the rule.
or research, (5] insurance claims adjustment or claims processing, or [6] insurance loss preven-
tion service." TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 151.0039 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
65. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.355(b).
66. Id. § 3.355(a)(7).
67. Id. § 3.355(c).
68. Id.
69. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0047 (Vernon Supp. 1988). See also TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. §§ 151.056 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (lump sum versus separated contract) and 151.058
(Vernon Supp. 1988) (person who performs taxable repair services is consumer of equipment
used in performing services, and total amount charged for repair, including charges for labor,
materials, overhead and profit is taxable).
70. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (eff. Apr. 4, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1984). See generally
comments in the preamble to the rule regarding painting. Id. The rule as adopted specifies
that repainting is presumed to be a restoration or remodeling activity. Id. § 3.357(b)(8). Many
comments also discussed the allocation of local taxes. Interestingly, the preamble to the final
rule (but not to the other service rules) noted that "[u]nless a section addresses a retroactive
application, a section is generally effective only from the effective date forward." 13 Tex. Reg.
1984. Although prospective-only application of rules appears logical (see also Comptroller
Hearing No. 17,587 (May 20, 1987)), the frequency with which administrative rules are "clari-
fied" rather than "revised" makes application of the approach less than clear and makes this
explicit statement of policy noteworthy. This rule accords great importance to the contract
between buyer and seller. See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (eff. May 16, 1988, 13 Tex.
Reg. 2419; as further amended eff. June 13, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 3002) which the comptroller
modified on an emergency basis as a result of the 1986 legislation (1) to distinguish between
contractors who build new structures or repair or remodel residential property and those who
repair, remodel or restore commercial property and (2) to provide that dirt and gravel hauling
is not taxable. Section 3.357 includes one of several recurring "5% rules." See 34 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE § 3.357. It provides that the manager's office of a multi-family or other residential
complex will only be residential if the space occupied by the office is 5% or less of the total
space of the residence. Id. § 3.357(a)(8). Facilities subject to the hotel occupancy tax are not
considered residential. Id. This rule now acknowledges that the distinction between lump-
sum and separated contracts is not valid with respect to remodeling or restoration of real
property, and it requires that a contract involving both remodeling and new construction be
taxed in total unless the charge for new construction labor is separately stated. Id.
§ 3.357(d)(2). Tangible personal property incorporated into real property may either be
purchased tax free, or the repairman or remodeler may pay tax on purchases and take credit
against tax later collected and remitted on the total sales price. Id. § 3.357(b)(4). Separate
rules are provided regarding items used in performing repairs, remodeling, or restoration for
exempt entities. Id. § 3.357(c)(4). The rule further notes that no sales tax is due on the wages
or salary paid by an employer to an employee who provides the labor to repair, remodel or
restore real property. Id. § 3.357(c)(6).
1989]
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These differences illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between real prop-
erty repair and remodeling services which are taxable as of January 1,
1988, 71 real property services which are taxable as of October 1, 1987,72 and
certain nontaxable maintenance services.7 3 According to the rule, a contrac-
tor is a "person who builds new structures, completes any part of an uncom-
pleted new structure which is an improvement to real property, or makes an
improvement to residential property."' 74 "Labor" includes all components
of a transaction or contract directly related to the described services, except
those attributable to materials incorporated into the realty. 75 Labor includes
even unrelated components, such as engineering and architectural charges
unless such charges are separately stated to the customer.76
Maintenance generally includes necessary, scheduled periodic work on op-
erational and functioning improvements to real property, whereas new con-
struction includes new improvements. 77 New construction specifically
includes the additional completed floors of or new area added to an existing
structure. 78 These definitions again highlight the practical difficulties in ad-
ministering the new law: does a complete gutting and rebuilding constitute
new construction or an improvement?
The definition of remodeling only partially helps answer this and similar
questions. The rule states that making over or rebuilding real property or
structures "in a similar but different way" constitutes remodeling. 79 On the
other hand, the rule defines "repair" as mending or bringing back "as near
as can be to its original working order real property which was broken, dam-
aged, or defective,"' 80 and it defines "restoration" as bringing "back as near
as can be to its original condition real property which is still functional but
which has faded, declined or deteriorated."'8
Charges for labor to maintain real property are not taxable.8 2 The comp-
troller presumes that services provided only as needed, and not pursuant to a
contract, are for repair or restoration. 83 The service provider, however, may
accept an exemption certificate stating that the labor is for the purpose of
maintenance rather than repair or restoration and that the customer will be
liable for any additional tax due in the event that it is determined that the
service provider performed repairs rather than maintenance.8 4
Real Property Services. As the preceding paragraph points out, the lines of
71. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101(a)(13) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
72. Id. § 151.0101(a)(11).
73. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(c)(2).
74. Id. § 3.357(a)(1).
75. Id. § 3.357(a)(2).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 3.357(a)(3).
78. Id. § 3.357(a)(4).
79. Id. § 3.357(a)(6).
80. Id. § 3.357(a)(7).
81. Id. § 3.357(a)(9).





demarcation among the various property services are far from clear. The
final version of the applicable rule8 5 reflects efforts to define more clearly the
meaning of real property services. 86 The final version of the rule also ad-
dresses more specifically than did earlier versions the application of the tax
to property management companies. 87 According to the rule, such compa-
nies need not collect tax on taxable services provided by their employees as
part of the overall management and operation of an apartment complex, of-
fice building or other real property if the value of the taxable service is
insignificant. 88
Security Services. Statutory language 89 and regulatory interpretation 90 pro-
vide that security services include any service provided within the scope of
the required license by an investigations company, guard company, alarm
system company, or similar company. The comptroller, however, has indi-
cated informally that he does not intend to tax ordinary delivery services
even if such services are made by a licensed security company. Services by
an employee in the regular course and scope of his duties for his employer,
for which the employer pays the employee his regular wages or salary, are
not taxable. 9' This rule, however, fails to include a definition of employer-
employee.
Sales for Resale. Tax Code Section 151.302 provides that a purchaser who
buys property or services and who complies with the resale exemption re-
quirements is not required to pay sales tax on his acquisition of the taxable
items. 92 The comptroller's regulations provide guidance for determining
what constitutes a resale of services. 93 These rules allow a seller to provide a
resale certificate to its suppliers of tangible personal property if (1) the seller
uses the property in providing services, and (2) the seller transfers to its
customers the care, custody and control of the tangible personal property.94
Thus, for example, a seller of data processing services who uses magnetic
tapes and transfers the tapes to its customers may qualify for exemption
from tax on its acquisition of the tapes. A seller may qualify for a resale
85. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356 (eff. Apr. 25, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2043). See also, 13
Tex. Reg. 5537 (1988) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356 regarding garbage and solid
waste services, cemetery upkeep, and property managers).
86. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(2)-(3).
87. See id. § 3.356(m).
88. Id. § 3.357(c).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0075 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
90. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.333 (eff. Mar. 24, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 1221).
91. Id. § 3.333(c).
92. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
93. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285 (resale certificate); id. § 3.298(f) (amusement
services). See also id. § 3.298(d) (providing for the circumstances in which travel agency must
pay tax on tickets it acquires); id. § 3.343(c) (credit reporting services); id. § 3.330(c) (data
processing); id. § 3.354(c) (debt collection services); id. § 3.342(e) (information services); id.
§ 3.355(h) (insurance services); id. § 3.357(d) (real property repair and remodeling); id.
§ 3.356(d) (real property services-resale certificate allowed if tangible personal property will
be incorporated into customer realty); id. § 3.333(f) (security services).
94. See supra note 93.
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exemption for a service if the buyer intends (1) to transfer the service as "an
integral part" of taxable services, or (2) to incorporate the service into tangi-
ble personal property to be resold.95 A service is an integral part of another
service if it "is essential to the performance of the taxable service and with-
out which the service could not be rendered. '96
Unrelated Services. One of the most troubling problems in determining what
is taxable arises when taxable services are sold in conjunction with nontax-
able services. On such mixed sales, it is sometimes difficult to determine
which services are taxable and which are not. Moreover, it is often even
more difficult to allocate the costs properly among services. Because it is
generally in both the buyer's and the seller's best interest to allocate only
minimal charges to the taxable part of a mixed sale, it is impractical to rely
on arms-length negotiation to produce a proper allocation. The comptroller
has therefore ruled that if a nontaxable "unrelated service" and a taxable
service are provided for a single charge, and the taxable services represent
more than five percent of the total charge, the total charge is presumed taxa-
ble.97 However, this presumption may be overcome by separately stating a
reasonable charge for taxable services provided to the customer. If a seller
separately states to the customer a reasonable charge for taxable services,
then a service that is (1) not a taxable service, (2) of a type that is commonly
provided on a stand alone basis, and (3) the performance of which is distinct
and identifiable, need not be taxed even though it is sold together with the
taxable service. 98 Charges for services or expenses (e.g., hotel rooms and
telephone calls) directly related to an incurred while providing a taxable ser-
vice are nonetheless taxable.99 The seller must maintain books supporting
the charge for taxable services based on the cost of providing the service or
on a comparison to the normal charge for the services if provided alone. 1oo
Although the insurance service rule contains the language summarized in
the preceding paragraph, the rule for insurance services differs somewhat
from the other service rules because it further provides that if an insurance
service is performed "as a part of a nontaxable service and the primary pur-
pose for purchasing the nontaxable service is not insurance related, no part
of the fee or charge is taxable."''1 1 For example, an appraisal required by a
lender as a condition of extending credit is not a taxable insurance service
because its primary purpose is to finance a loan, even if the appraisal is also
used as the basis for establishing minimum property insurance required by
95. See supra note 93.
96. See supra note 93, but note that §§ 3.357(d) and 3.356(d) do not include the same
language on transfers of taxable services.
97. Id. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.343(d) (credit reporting services); id. § 3.330(d)
(data processing); id. § 3.354(e) (debt collection services); id. § 3.342(f) (information services);
id. § 3.355(i) (insurance services); id. § 3.357(h) (real property repair and remodeling); id.
§ 3.356(i) (real property services); id. § 3.333(g) (security services). But see id. § 3.298
(amusement services) (does not include the same general rule).
98. See supra note 97.
99. See supra note 97.
100. See supra note 97.




Multistate and Other Location of Sale Issues. The difficulty of determining
where a sale occurs makes the administration of the new services taxes more
complex. If a California data processing company provides services to Texas
customers, has a California sale or a Texas sale occurred? Does the answer
differ if the data processing input consists of compiling a list of purchases of
goods in Nevada? What if the information is transmitted over phone lines in
Arizona? In a valiant effort to provide some sense of certainty for taxpayers,
the comptroller has promulgated standards for determining the location of
sales. 10 3 These rules are necessary not only to avoid placing Texas compa-
nies at a competitive disadvantage with companies from other states (a result
that would occur if the location of the service provider were the only test), 104
but also to determine which local taxing jurisdiction is entitled to impose
tax.10 5
The multistate rules are critical because they determine whether, and to
what extent, purchases by multistate entities will be subject to Texas sales
tax. A multistate customer purchasing services for the benefit of both a
Texas and non-Texas location is responsible for allocating and paying tax on
that portion that benefits the Texas location.106 This procedure differs from
general practice in that it requires the buyer to self-assess and remit the tax.
Tax is not due to the extent the services are used outside of Texas. The
buyer may use "any reasonable method" supported by business records to
determine which services are for the benefit of Texas locations and therefore
taxable.' 0 7 To the extent that a buyer uses a service to support a "separate,
identifiable segment" of its business, other than the general administra-
tion/operation of the business, the service is presumed to be used at the loca-
tion where the buyer conducts that part of the business.108 To the extent
service use cannot be assigned to an identifiable segment, the rules presume
it is used at the customer's principal place of business, i.e., the place from
which the customer directs or manages the trade or business.109
102. Id.
103. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.343(f) (credit reporting services); id. § 3.330(f) (data
processing); id. § 3.354(g) (debt collection services); id. § 3.342(h) (information services); id.
§ 3.3550) (insurance services). No multistate provisions exist in the rules regarding amuse-
ment services, real property and remodeling services, real property services, or security
services.
104. The legislature did not intend to tax services used outside Texas, even if a Texas seller
provided the services. The legislature intended to tax services used in Texas, even if a non-
Texas seller provided the services. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.330(e)-(f) (Vernon Supp.
1988).
105. Determining which city, MTA or county sales taxes apply will determine whether the
total tax will be six percent of sale proceeds, eight percent, or fall between these two
percentages.
106. See supra note 103.
107. See supra note 103.
108. See supra note 103.
109. Id. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.343(g) (credit reporting services); id. § 3.330(g)
(data processing); id. § 3.342(i) (information services). But see id. § 3.2980) (amusement serv-
ices; local tax allocated to city, county and/or MTA/CTD where amusement event occurred).
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For sales of many services, city, MTA or county taxes are due to the local
unit if the seller has only one place of business, "the location where clients
request service."' 10 These rules provide that if service is ordered from one
location, but provided from another, tax is due where service is provided. 11
If the seller is outside the boundary of a local taxing jurisdiction, but the
buyer is inside such a jurisdiction, use tax is due. 1 2 The seller collects the
tax if it has representation in the jurisdiction under the applicable adminis-
trative rule; otherwise, the buyer must pay the tax. 13 An in-state customer
purchasing services for the benefit of more than one local taxing jurisdiction
must allocate the extent of the benefit of such services for each jurisdiction,
and a multistate customer purchasing services for the benefit of both in and
out-of-state locations is responsible for paying local tax.1 14 This allocation
process may be burdensome for many buyers, because many businesses do
not typically organize data with respect to services on a state-by-state basis
or on a city-by-city basis.
Different rules from those outlined above apply to debt collection serv-
ices, 15 insurance services,'1 6 real property repair and remodeling serv-
ices, 117 real property services, 118 and security services. '1 9 Local taxes apply
to these services in the same way that they apply to tangible personal prop-
erty. 120 Service providers generally collect local tax if their place of business
is within the local unit, regardless of the location at which service is actually
provided.12 1 MTA and CTD taxes do not apply to services provided outside
the boundaries of transit areas.1 22 The seller is responsible for collecting use
tax on services provided to a customer within a local unit if the seller's place
of business is outside such a jurisdiction. 123
According to the administrative rule on amusement services, if an event
occurs in Texas, the amusement service is in Texas and is taxable.1 24 Use
tax is due on an out-of-state sale to an event that will take place in Texas.1 25
If no ticket or other physical evidence of admission is involved, the rule
considers admission to be at the seller's place of business. 126 Local tax is
allocated to the location at which the amusement event occurred.1 27
110. See supra note 109.
111. See supra note 109.
112. See supra note 109.
113. See supra note 109.
114. See supra notes 103 and 109.
115. Id. § 3.354(h).
116. Id. § 3.355(k).
117. Id. § 3.357(e).
118. Id. § 3.356(k).
119. Id. § 3.333(k).
120. See supra notes 115-119.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also Comptroller Hearing Nos. 22,681 (Aug. 19, 1988) and 21,211 (May 26,
1988) which discuss application of the MTA tax.
123. See supra notes 115-119.
124. 34 TEx. AoMIN. CODE § 3.298(e)(1).
125. Id. § 3.298(e)(2).
126. Id. § 3.298(e)(3).
127. Id. § 3.2980).
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Exemptions and Grandfathering. As last year's survey article pointed out, 12 8
the 1987 legislature enacted two distinct grandfathering provisions 129 and
one related-company exemption with respect to sales taxes. 130 Many of the
issues raised with respect to these provisions remain unanswered. On occa-
sion, comptroller's representatives have evinced a willingness to interpret the
applicable rules broadly, e.g., to allow price reductions despite the regulatory
provision that no price changes are permissible,'31 but they have also inter-
preted some provisions very narrowly, e.g., by asserting that the exemption
for affiliated "entities" may apply only to corporations. 32 With respect to
this latter interpretation, it appears that legislative action may be necessary
to confirm an exemption for sales among related partners or other non-cor-
porate entities.
Another issue that remains somewhat clouded is the status of contracts
that fail to specify a definite amount of goods or a specific price. The rule
which provides that such contracts are not eligible for grandfather status
33
seems much more restrictive than the statute, perhaps impermissibly so, and
probably more restrictive than necessary for policy reasons. Some compa-
nies may attempt to abuse the grandfather rule by increasing the amount of
goods or services after the prior contract cut-off date. However, other par-
ties may have operated for a number of years with a contract for services "as
needed," and continue to operate-at the same levels as prior to July 1987-
on that basis. The comptroller would have a difficult time justifying a denial
of prior contract status in such cases, and, despite the restrictive language in
the rule, the comptroller has not clearly indicated that he will do so. The
comptroller proposed or adopted new rules on other issues as well, including
a rule regarding the definition of "engaged in business" in Texas for sales tax
purposes. '
34
128. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxation, 42 Sw. L.J. 633,
640-41 (1988) for a description of the recent legislative changes affecting services sold in Texas.
This article describes the regulatory guidance on services taxes that the comptroller issued
during the months immediately preceding this survey period.
129. See supra note 21.
130. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.346 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
131. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (which includes form for claiming prior contract
exemption). The policy underlying the restrictions in the rule is apparently to prevent taxpay-
ers from artificially expanding a contract in order to increase the amount or types of services
that are exempt under the grandfather rule; a decrease in price or the extension or renewal of a
contract that, by its original terms, extends beyond July 1, 1990 does not violate this policy.
Consistent with this observation, a spokesperson in the Comptroller's office indicated infor-
mally that price decreases and/or renewals for periods after July 1, 1990 will not adversely
impact qualification for grandfathering.
132. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.346 (Vernon Supp. 1989). The language of the stat-
utory exemption is broad enough to include noncorporate entities.
133. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE at § 3.319(a).
134. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286 (eff. Aug. 25, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 3989). As
amended, the rule provides that advertising will be considered to be intended for Texas if 75%
of the consumers are located in Texas. This mechanical test should present some interesting
issues, e.g., where are traveling radio listeners located? How is the percentage determined?
The rule specifically provides that a non-Texas retailer not otherwise engaged in business in
Texas will not be treated as engaged in business here "by merely placing a request for financ-
ing, telecommunications, banking, marketing or debt collection services at an out-of-state loca-
tion of a service provider even though the service is performed in whole or in part in Texas."
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II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. Calculation of Taxable Capital
Although Texas courts did not render as many significant franchise tax
decisions as in the last survey period, several recent decisions merit discus-
sion. In State v. Shell Oil Co. 135 the Austin court of appeals held that the
taxpayer, an oil drilling company, was entitled to exclude from surplus its
contra-asset account for amortization of unproven leaseholds.1 36 In accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), the taxpayer
had utilized the successful efforts method of accounting by which it amor-
tized, based on experience, a portion of the costs of the nonproducing lease-
holds. The district court found that the company based the accounts on
reasonable estimates which accurately reflected the corporation's financial
condition. 37 The court ruled, therefore, that the company could exclude
the contra-asset account from surplus.138 The Austin court of appeals
agreed, stating that the comptroller's long-standing policy of not reducing
surplus by estimated writedowns, no matter how accurate, was contrary to
the franchise tax statute, which contemplated that surplus be determined
upon the true financial condition of the corporation. 139 It is noteworthy that
the 1987 legislation providing that surplus includes contingent or estimated
liabilities or losses, or writedown of assets, probably does not limit a tax-
payer's ability to amortize unproven leaseholds because the legislation pro-
vides an exception for, among other items, contra-asset accounts for
amortization. 140
The Austin court of appeals in Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. Bullock 141
held that an acquired corporation (the "taxpayer") whose new parent corpo-
ration required it to increase the book value of certain of its assets to reflect
their takeover value 42 rather than their historical cost must value such as-
sets for franchise tax purposes based on the higher takeover value.' 4 3 The
taxpayer continued to use the historical cost of these assets on its working
Id. § 3.286(a)(l)(G)(ii) (emphasis added). Out-of-state sellers must identify tax collected as
Texas tax.
135. 747 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
136. Id. at 56. The rationale in the Shell case is similar to that provided in State v. Sun
Refining & Marketing, Inc., 740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
137. 747 S.W.2d at 55.
138. Id. at 57.
139. Id. The court noted that the comptroller's position is in conflict with, among other
cases, Huey & Philip Hardware Co. v. Shepperd, 251 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1952), in which the
Texas Supreme Court held that a reserve for bad debts can be excluded from surplus.
140. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(i)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The statute now pro-
vides that all oil and gas exploration activities must be reported pursuant to either the success-
ful efforts or the full cost method of accounting. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(g ) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
141. 753 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
142. The takeover value of a corporation's assets equals the fair market value of such assets
as determined by allocating to such assets the consideration paid for the corporation by the
new owner. This method of accounting is often referred to as "push-down accounting." See
Comptroller Hearing No. 20,278 (May 16, 1987) (discussion of push-down accounting).
143. 753 S.W.2d at 783-84.
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papers, but used the takeover value for such assets on its general ledger.' 44
The comptroller disregarded the work papers in determining the taxpayer's
franchise tax liability because its administrative rule 14 5 required corpora-
tions to determine their franchise tax liability based on information con-
tained in the corporation's general ledger. The court ruled that this rule was
not arbitrary and capricious and that the taxpayer should have complied
with the rule.
14 6
The taxpayer in Southern Clay argued that the rule violated the equal and
uniform taxation clause in the Texas Constitution because similarly-situated
corporations which keep their general ledger based on historical cost, rather
than takeover values, would pay lower franchise taxes than the taxpayer. 147
The court rejected this argument because the taxpayer did not show that the
challenged rule had been "applied to a large class of other individuals" and
was not therefore inherently discriminatory. 148 This decision, however, ap-
parently leaves open the possibility that the comptroller's policy regarding
the valuation of assets at their takeover value could be challenged success-
fully if a taxpayer were to present sufficient evidence of the discriminatory
application of the policy to a large class of other individuals. 149
In Sunoco Terminals, Inc. v. Bullock 150 the appeals court held that a
newly formed corporation can be required to include in its taxable capital
the assets it received from a related corporation even though the transferor
corporation also included such assets in its taxable capital for the same
year. ' 51 Both companies included the transferred assets in their tax bases for
approximately three months because a newly formed corporation pays tax
for its first report period based on its capital at the end of such period,
thereby including the transferred assets in its capital. An established corpo-
ration, however, pays franchise tax in advance and bases such advance pay-
ment in its capital for the fiscal year generally ending before the transfer of
the assets to the related corporation. 52 The court ruled that the franchise
tax is a tax for the privilege of doing business in Texas and is not a tax on
144. If the taxpayer had kept two general ledgers, one for historical cost and one for take-
over value, as it did for one fiscal year, it would not have been required to use the takeover
values in computing its franchise tax. Id. at 782.
145. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (repealed April 15, 1988). The comptroller substan-
tially revised this rule in 1988 to reflect the amendments to the franchise tax statutes in 1987.
34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (eff. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2970).
146. 753 S.W.2d at 783. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391(c)(3) (1988) (eff. June 28, 1988, 13
Tex. Reg. 2970) requires push-down accounting if the majority of a corporation's voting stock
is acquired through a purchase.
147. This argument is essentially the same as the prevailing argument made by the tax-
payer in Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxation, 42 Sw. L.J. 631, 644
(1988) (discussing Sage).
148. 753 S.W.2d at 784.
149. But see Comptroller Hearing No. 22,281 (April 21, 1988) (concluding that comptrol-
ler's policy with respect to push-down accounting is constitutional because taxpayers are not
required to employ push-down accounting on their books).
150. 756 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
15 1. Id. at 420.
152. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.151-171.153 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Because the
first two (and often three) report periods are based on the first year's capital of a new corpora-
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capital; therefore, Texas can require related corporations to pay franchise
tax based on the same capital. 15 3
The comptroller issued several noteworthy decisions with respect to deter-
mination of capital. In Decision 20,999154 the comptroller ruled that push-
down accounting should be used not only when it results in an increase in
value of the purchased corporation's assets, but also when it results in a
decrease in the value of the purchased corporation's assets.155 This reduc-
tion in value can occur if the purchase price allocated to an asset is less than
the taxpayer's basis in such asset. The comptroller stated that the historical
cost method of determining capital should not be employed when the facts,
such as a recent purchase of the taxpayer's stock, demonstrate that such a
method is no longer appropriate. 156
In Decision 22,077157 the comptroller treated an advance between related
parties as debt even though the interest rate on the note was zero and the
debtor repaid little or none of the advance in the initial years of the loan. 158
While noting that the case presented a close question, the comptroller was
swayed by evidence demonstrating that the borrower could have obtained a
loan from an unrelated party and that the lender had a valid business reason
for charging no interest.' 59 Similarly, the comptroller in Decision 21,735160
treated an advance between related parties as a debt although the transaction
included no interest, no written note, and no collateral.161 The comptroller
stated that the lack of interest usually weighs heavily against a finding that a
valid debt exists but concluded that the lender in this case had made a delib-
erate decision not to charge interest because employees of the borrower
would benefit by the lender's not charging interest. 162
In Decision 22,747163 the comptroller ruled that preferred stock issued by
the taxpayer in bankruptcy must be included in the taxpayer's stated capi-
tal. 164 The taxpayer asserted that Accounting Principles Board Opinion No.
16 requires the acquiring entity's books to reflect the stock as a liability. The
comptroller responded that because the taxpayer was not the acquiring en-
tion, the franchise tax statute offers significant planning opportunities if contributions to a new
corporation can be deferred until after its first accounting year.
153. 756 S.W.2d at 420.
154. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,999 (March 18, 1988).
155. Id.
156. Id. The comptroller reached the same conclusion with respect to "negative push-
down accounting" in Comptroller Hearing No. 21,447 (Feb. 18, 1988).
157. Comptroller Hearing No. 22,077 (May 6, 1988).
158. Id.
159. Id. For an extensive discussion of the factors used by the comptroller in distinguish-
ing debt from equity, see Comptroller Hearing Nos. 20,956 and 20,957 (Aug. 18, 1987).
160. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,735 (May 10, 1988). In Comptroller Hearing Nos.
20,956 and 20,957 the comptroller may have been influenced by a 14 percent minority owner-
ship in the borrower. The minority ownership is significant because the parent corporation of
the borrower would be less willing to make a loan to the subsidiary if the subsidiary possibly
could not repay the debt.
161. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,735 (May 10, 1988).
162. Id.




tity, the Opinion did not control. 165
In a reversal of longstanding policy, the comptroller's office has advised
taxpayers orally and in ruling letters that a negative balance in surplus can
be offset against stated capital.166 This policy change should be especially
important to corporations required to maintain high stated capital. 167 As a
result, taxpayers should file refund claims for any open years for which this
policy change would result in lower taxes than were reported and paid.
B. Allocation of Capital
In Decision 21,221168 the comptroller ruled that gross receipts received by
a taxpayer from a grantor trust (i.e., a trust ignored for federal income tax
purposes) should be treated as distributions from the trust rather than as
attributable to the situs of the underlying trust assets. 169 The grantor trust
in this decision held a 99.99 percent interest as a general partner in a royalty
partnership. Although the trustee was located in Texas, the taxpayer argued
that its gross receipts from the trust should be allocated based on the part-
nership's principal place of business. The comptroller conceded the reasona-
bleness of the taxpayer's position, but concluded that he could not ignore the
existence of the grantor trust for franchise tax purposes. 170
In Decision 20,540171 the comptroller held that proceeds from the sale of
crude oil that the taxpayer delivered to a common carrier pipeline in Louisi-
ana and then transported to Texas are Texas receipts. 172 The taxpayer as-
serted that it never delivered the oil to Texas because the purchaser took
possession of the oil in Louisiana. The comptroller disagreed, and allocated
the receipts to Texas, reasoning that the taxpayer ultimately shipped the oil
to the buyer in Texas. 173 The comptroller claimed that constructive condi-
tions of the delivery, such as FOB point, control and title, are irrelevant in
determining whether receipts are allocable to Texas. 174
165. Id. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.404 (eff. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2971) (stated
capital).
166. It is not clear whether the comptroller will amend 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405 (eff.
June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2972) (defining surplus) to reflect this change in policy. The Texas
Corporation Franchise Tax Report (last revised December 1986) states that if surplus is a
negative amount, it cannot be subtracted from stated capital.
167. Consider, for example, a corporation responsible for paying Texas franchise tax with
$10 million of stated capital and $10 million of surplus. Assume that all of the corporation's
gross receipts are allocable to Texas. Under prior policy, the corporation would owe $67,000
of franchise tax each year; under current policy, the corporation would owe only $150 of tax
each year. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
168. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,221 (Oct. 2, 1987).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,540 (Mar. 29, 1988).
172. Id.
173. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon 1982) (stating that FOB point or condi-




C. Liability for Tax-Doing Business in Texas
Recent comptroller's decisions confirm that minimal Texas activity can
cause a corporation to be "doing business" in the state for franchise tax
purposes. In Decision 22,840175 the comptroller ruled that a corporation
establishes a constitutional nexus with Texas by making deliveries into Texas
by common carrier and by having two representatives that periodically visit
Texas to remind customers that the taxpayer will quote prices on its prod-
ucts and to thank customers for their past business, even though the repre-
sentatives take no orders while in the state.176 The comptroller stated that
the fact that the representatives live outside of Texas is unimportant. 177
Decision 22,440178 concluded that a corporation which had no offices or
employees in Texas, but which had a single representative who spent less
than twenty percent of his working time in Texas, was doing business in
Texas. 179 The representative distributed brochures in the state but did not
solicit or take orders. Because the representative's job was to promote sales
in Texas, the comptroller ruled that the corporation had a constitutional
nexus with Texas. 180
According to Decision 21,223,181 a corporation that submitted an applica-
tion for, but was denied, a Certificate of Withdrawal from Texas was respon-
sible for the payment of Texas franchise tax.1 82 The comptroller ruled that
the corporation was responsible for the tax irrespective of whether the cor-
poration had a constitutional nexus with Texas. 183 The comptroller also
ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Secretary of
State correctly refused the Certificate of Withdrawal. 184
D. Consequences of Failure to Pay
The Corpus Christi court of appeals held in M & M Construction Co. v.
175. Comptroller Hearing No. 22,840 (July 15, 1988).
176. Id.
177. Id. An important facet of the decision concerns the comptroller's statement that the
date of the amendment of 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406 (eff. Jan. 9, 1986, 10 Tex. Reg. 4950)
(subsequently amended with minor changes on December 28, 1987, 12 Tex. Reg. 4702), the
rule setting forth the standard for determining whether a corporation is doing business in
Texas, is significant. The comptroller implied that the amendment was a change in the comp-
troller's test for what constitutes doing business in Texas rather than a mere clarification of the
previous rule. In many tax controversies, the Tax Division of the Comptroller's office had
taken the position that the amended rule was a mere clarification of the prior rule. See id.
(preamble to amendment implies that at least certain provisions in amended rule are clarifica-
tions of prior rule).
178. Comptroller Hearing No. 22,440 (Apr. 19, 1988).
179. Id.
180. Id. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406(c)(4) (eff. Dec. 28, 1987, 12 Tex. Reg. 4702)
(solicitation); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 107 S.
Ct. 2810, 97 L. Ed.2d 199 (1987) (defining nexus in the context of establishing and maintaining
a sales market).
181. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,223 (Dec. 21, 1987).
182. Id.
183. Id. Corporations are responsible for paying Texas franchise tax if they are chartered
in Texas, qualified to do business in Texas, or are doing business in Texas. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1982).
184. Comptroller Hearing No. 21,223 (Dec. 21, 1987).
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Great American Insurance Co. 185 that a corporation which lost its corporate
charter for failure to pay franchise taxes should be allowed a reasonable op-
portunity to cure its lack of capacity either by paying its delinquent taxes or
by bringing suit in the shareholders' names. 186 The district court had dis-
missed with prejudice the taxpayer's suit after it had forfeited its corporate
charter for failure to pay franchise taxes. 187 The court reversed the dismis-
sal, stating that the purpose of the statute in forfeiting charters of corpora-
tions that failed to pay franchise taxes is to encourage the payment of taxes
and not to prohibit causes of action. 188
E. Administrative Developments
The significant changes that the 1987 legislature 189 made to the franchise
tax precipitated the revision of virtually all of the most significant comptrol-
ler's rules concerning the franchise tax and the issuance of additional new
rules. The newly revised franchise tax rules include numerous definitions
and directions for determining Texas franchise tax.
Because taxpayers with a surplus of more than one million dollars are now
required to use generally accepted accounting principles for franchise tax
purposes,190 the comptroller has provided a definition of GAAP.191 GAAP
generally means the broad accounting rules formally adopted by the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accounts ("AICPA") or its designees
through publication of a statement, interpretation, opinion or research bulle-
tin.' 92 If no such effective, published pronouncement exists, formal accept-
ance may be a written interpretation of an AICPA committee or its
designee.193 If no such written interpretation exists, formal acceptance may
be through accepted industry accounting practices, publication of the SEC
or of regulatory agencies, or "any other means which may be shown by the
taxpayer to indicate formal acceptance."'' 94
Whether a taxpayer has one million dollars of surplus, and is therefore
required to use GAAP, depends on the accounting method used in the last
federal return originally due before the franchise tax report, unless another
185. 747 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
186. Id. at 555.
187. Id. at 554.
188. Id. at 554, citing Bluebonnet Farms, Inc. v. Gibraltar Savings Association, 618
S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
189. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxation, 42 Sw. L.J. 633,
648 (1988).
190. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
191. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391(c)(1) (eff. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2970). By its
terms, the rule applies to franchise tax reports originally due on or after January 1, 1988. This
rule, which includes subject matter that was formerly in 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.408, re-
pealed Jan. 1, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 165, is an entirely new rule, and it replaces the former 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391 (repealed 1987), which had required a corporate taxpayer to com-
pute tax based on its financial condition as shown in its "books and records of account."
Previous versions of the rule had also required corporations to base franchise tax on their
books and records. See, e.g., id. § 3.391(b)(1).
192. Id. § 3.391(c)(1).
193. Id.
194. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.391(d)(2).
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method is specifically required by the Tax Code.195 Even if the rule allows a
corporation to use the federal income tax method, the corporation must ac-
count for income exempt for federal income tax purposes in determining
surplus and gross receipts.196 The GAAP reporting method need not con-
form to financial reports, although the rule presumes accurate factual asser-
tions in published financial statements. 197 When filing a franchise tax report,
a corporation must use the same accounting method for both gross receipts
and surplus, using either the GAAP or the federal income tax method.198 A
change in accounting will be recognized only if it corrects an "accounting
error," which, as defined, can result from a mistake in math, in the applica-
tion of accounting principles, or from an oversight or unintentional misuse
of facts that existed on the date upon which the report is based. 199
Surplus. A new rule promulgated in June 1988 provides guidance regarding
calculating surplus for franchise tax purposes. 2°° The rule defines a number
of key terms. An unrealized, estimate or contingent loss or obligation in-
cludes an appropriation of retained earnings for any purpose.201 The term
also includes an account to record a reasonably anticipated loss or obligation
which has been reasonably estimated as of the date on which the tax is
based. 202 The rule provides that surplus must be based on a corporation's
accounting period ending in the calender year ending immediately prior to
the reporting period at issue, or, if no accounting period ends in the previous
calender year, as of December 31 of the previous calendar year.203
A write-down of assets is any "reduction or offset of the cost of an asset by
valuation, allowance, reserve or contra-asset account, or through direct
write-off of the asset. ' '2°4 A write-down of assets does not include a direct
write-off of all or a portion of the cost of the asset to reflect a permanent
decline in the asset's value due to a specifically identifiable event. 205 The
taxpayer may exclude this latter type of write-off. The rule also defines de-
pletion, depreciation and amortization, exclusive of goodwill, and further
defines tax effect and investee.206
The taxpayer must use the equity method of accounting for partnerships
or joint ventures. 207 The final rule, unlike the proposed version,20 8 allows a
195. Id. § 3.391(d)(3).
196. Id. § 3.391(c)(2).
197. Id. § 3.391(b)(1) and (4).
198. Id. § 3.391(b)(5).
199. 34 TEX. ADMIN., CODE § 3.405. The rule's provisions apply to franchise tax reports
originally due on or after January 1, 1988. Id. § 3.405(a). This rule replaces former Section
3.405 (as amended in 1977), which was repealed. See Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 13 Tex.
Reg. 1545 (1988). The new rule includes some elements of a draft version of Section 3.405
which was circulated, but not officially proposed, in 1985.
200. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(c)(1).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 3.405(b).
203. Id. § 3.405(c)(2).
204. Id. § 3.405(e)(9).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 3.405(d)(l)(B).
207. See 13 Tex. Reg. 1529.
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corporation with less than one million dollars in surplus to report its oil and
gas exploration and production activities using the same method used for
federal income tax purposes; other corporations must use the successful ef-
forts or full cost method. 20 9 The rule also provides specific guidance with
respect to intercompany tax accounts. The rule excludes a liability of one
member to another in a consolidated group from that member's surplus only
if the related receivable is included in the second member's surplus. 2 10
Surplus includes: amortization of goodwill resulting from the acquisition
of an ownership interest in an investee or subsidiary corporation; deferred
investment tax credit; income tax accrued other than for actual liability (e.g.,
for period under audit); and liabilities for employee benefits (e.g., pensions,
bonuses, vacations) to the extent they are debt. 2 11 As noted above, surplus
does not include a direct write-off of an asset.2 12 Redeemable preferred
stock is excluded from surplus if it is debt.2 13 The amount paid for treasury
shares is also not included in surplus. 214 Additional rules apply to foreign
currency transactions.
2 15
Stated Capital. The stated capital rule2 16 now provides that stated capital
equals the sum of (1) the par value of all par valued shares of the corpora-
tion; (2) the consideration fixed by the corporation pursuant to Article 2.5 of
the Texas Business Corporation Act for shares issued without par value, less
the amount of consideration paid to the corporation, which may be less than
all the consideration, that the board allocated to surplus up to sixty days
after the corporation issued the shares; and (3) other amounts transferred to
the stated capital of a corporation, whether upon payment of a share divi-
dend or upon resolution by the board to transfer all or part of the surplus to
stated capital. 2 17 The revised version of the rule further includes treasury
shares in stated capital until such shares are cancelled and restored to the
status of authorized but unissued shares, and includes redeemable preferred
stock in stated capital unless it is debt. 218
Gross Receipts. By its terms, the new gross receipts rule applies to franchise
tax reports originally due on or after January 1, 1988.219 The rule, which
208. Id. § 3.405(d)(1)(C).
209. Id. § 3.405(d)(3).
210. Id. § 3.405(e).
211. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
212. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(e)(10).
213. Id. § 3.405(e)(8).
214. Id. § 3.405(e)(3).
215. Id. § 3.404 (eff. June 28, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 2971).
216. Id. § 3.404(a).
217. Id. § 3.404(b), (c).
218. Id. § 3.403. See also id. § 3.391 (accounting methods) discussed supra, which also
applies to determining gross receipts.
219. Id. § 3.403(b)(5), which excludes:
[S]eparately recorded reimbursements of actual expenses paid to third parties,
bad debt recoveries, recovery of basis on sale or condemnation of a capital asset
or investment, repayment of loan principal, amounts received for issuance of
capital stock, refund of taxes (except interest thereon), equity earnings of an
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includes several definitions, defines revenue as including, unless otherwise
specifically provided for, any funds, from any source, recognized by the cor-
poration, excluding certain specifically listed items.220 The rule also sets
forth a series of rules for determining gross receipts, as well as a separate
series of rules for allocating gross receipts. 22' The rules contain specific in-
structions for determining what constitutes receipts, including sales to which
the "throwback rule" applies. 22 2
The new rule specifically provides that expense allocations by a parent
among one or more of its subsidiaries, other than income tax allocations for
consolidated return purposes, produce gross receipts for the parent regard-
less of whether the parent actually receives cash from the subsidiaries unless
an agency relationship exists.223 The rule further provides that all revenues
of a newspaper transacting its primary business activities in Texas are Texas
receipts.224 The rule, however, excludes revenues from the sale of newspa-
pers outside of Texas. 225 All revenues of a radio or television station that
broadcasts or transmits from Texas stations are Texas receipts, even if some
of the audience is outside Texas.226 The rule excludes revenue from pro-
grams that are sold or leased to the national media for broadcasting or
transmitting. 227
The comptroller set forth the methodology for calculating net gains and
losses on Texas sales. 228 The location-of-the-payor test continues to exist. 229
Indeed, this rule specifically allocates the net gain on sales of intangibles held
as capital assets or investments to the location of the payor. 230 The rule
provides a special exception for dividends and/or interest received from a
national bank, 23' from the United States Treasury or other Government
debt, from GNMA, FNMA, or FHLMC mortgage bank securities or certifi-
cates, and from partnership receipts.232
investee, foreign dividend gross-ups allowed by the Internal Revenue Service
and intercorporate tax allocations.
220. Id. § 3.403(d).
221. Id. § 3.403(d)(1).
222. Id. § 3.403(d)(3).
223. Id. § 3.403(d)(10).
224. Id.
225. This rule is an interesting contrast to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286 (eff. Aug. 25,
1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 3988), which treats advertising as intended for Texas customers for sales
tax purposes as if 75% of the customers are located in Texas.
226. Id. § 3.403(d)(11).
227. Id. § 3.403(e)(1).
228. Indeed, the rule specifically provides that net gain on sales of intangibles held as capi-
tal assets or investments is allocated to the location-of-the payor. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. § 3.403(e)(5).
231. With respect to partnerships, the rule provides that a corporation's share of net profits
are allocated to the principal place of business of the partnership which is the location of the
daily operations or, if the partnership operates in more than one state, its commercial domicile.
Id. § 3.403(e)(9). A corporation's share of the partnership's gross receipts may be used as
gross receipts if allowed as revenue by GAAP. Id. (under former policy, a corporation was
allowed to choose between net profit and gross receipts methods).
232. Id. § 3.403(e)(12). It is not yet clear whether this test is the same as the "essence of
the transaction" test previously used by the Comptroller. Service receipts are allocated to the
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The new rule encompasses newly taxable services by providing that if a
transaction involves elements of a sale of tangible personal property and a
service, and if no documentation exists to show separate charges, "the pre-
dominant aspect of the transaction" controls the allocation of charges.
233
The comptroller has issued regulatory guidance to provide for allocation of
capital and tax among a bank's principal office and qualified branch
facilities. 234
Pursuant to Section 171.084 of the Tax Code, 235 certain solicitation activi-
ties will not cause a corporation to be doing business in Texas.236 Although
a corporation need not apply for the exemption provided by this section, a
foreign corporation that has obtained a certificate of authority or given noti-
fication to the comptroller that it is doing business in Texas must also inform
the comptroller in writing of the exemption by the due date of the first report
for which the payment is due. 237 Thereafter, the corporation must send
written notice to the comptroller only when the corporation no longer quali-
fies for the exemption.238 A foreign corporation that has neither obtained a
certificate of authority nor notified the comptroller that it is doing business
should send written notice to the comptroller only when the corporation no
longer qualifies for the exemption. 239 The rule also provides examples of
corporations that exceed the limits on solicitation in Texas. 24° These exam-
ples illustrate both that the initial period of a corporation without a certifi-
cate of authority begins on the date of its first trade show in Texas and that




A. Application of Tax
In Coastal States Crude Gathering Co. v. State Property Tax Board 242 the
Austin court of appeals held that section 24.01(5) of the Tax Code (as in
effect for the tax year at issue), 24 3 which provided for taxing the intangible
value of the transportation operation of a business's oil pipelines and com-
mon carrier pipelines engaged in the transportation of oil, imposes a tax on
only the intangible value of oil transportation activity and not on the intangi-
ble value of the taxpayer's entire transportation operations. 244 The Property
location where the service is performed, and receipts for the procurement of services are allo-
cated to the place where the service procurement is performed. Id. §§ 3.403(e)(13), (14).
233. Id. § 3.411.
234. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.084 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
235. Id.
236. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.414(c)(1) (eff. Dec. 28, 1987, 12 Tex. Reg. 4702).
237. Id.
238. Id. § 3.414(c)(2).
239. Id. § 3.414(d).
240. Id. § 3.414(e).
241. 747 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
242. A 1987 amendment to section 24.01 of the Tax Code deleted motor bus carriers and
common or contract motor carriers from the list of businesses taxed under that section.
243. 747 S.W.2d at 63.
244. Id. at 62.
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Tax Board asserted that because the statute uses the term "business" rather
than "activity," all of a taxpayer's transportation operations are taxed if the
taxpayer engages in any oil transportation activities.245 The court disagreed,
stating that the more logical interpretation of the statute is that it taxes only
the business activity of transporting oil. 246
Several attorney general opinions interpreted the constitutionality of tax
legislation passed by the 70th Legislature. In one of these opinions, 247 the
Attorney General ruled on the constitutionality of legislation authorizing
municipal utility districts to issue bonds to provide facilities that would serve
only a defined area or some designated real property within a defined
area. 248 The question before the Attorney General concerned whether the
legislation violated the "equal distribution" requirement of article XVI, sec-
tion 59 of the Texas Constitution, 249 which essentially provides that taxes
must be fairly proportioned according to the benefit to the taxed property.250
Because the legislation mandated that only property within a defined area
can be taxed to pay the debt service on the utility bonds, the Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that the statute met the "equal distribution" standard, 251 espe-
cially in light of the fact that the "equal distribution" standard has not been
interpreted to require exact apportionment. 252
The Attorney General ruled25 3 that the additional penalty under section
33.01 of the Tax Code 254 could not be used to defray the taxing unit's costs
of collecting delinquent taxes but must be used solely to compensate attor-
neys who have contracted to collect such taxes.255 The taxing authority ar-
gued that a county could impose the maximum fifteen percent penalty
allowed under section 33.01 of the Tax Code and then pay the attorney col-
lecting the delinquent taxes only ninety percent of the penalty while retain-
ing the rest of the penalty as reimbursement of the county's costs of
collecting delinquent taxes. The Attorney General relied on legislative his-
tory and court decisions, which referred to the penalty as "attorneys' fees,"
in reaching his conclusion. 256
Both the courts and the Attorney General issued opinions regarding the
constitutionality of property tax rollback elections. In Vinson v. Burgess257
245. Id. at 63. The court stated that any other conclusion would lead to absurd results
because shippers who, for example, transported only one gallon of oil would be taxed on their
entire transportation operation. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-836 (1987).
249. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
250. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-836 (1987).
251. See Dallas County Levee Dist. No. 2 v. Looney, 207 S.W. 310 (Tex. 1918) (stating
that Texas Constitution does not require legislature to tax exactly in proportion to benefit
derived).
252. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-857 (1988).
253. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1982).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 755 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ granted).
257. The Vinson case concerns the currently effective Section 26.07 of the Tax Code, which
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the Fort Worth court of appeals held that section 26.07 of the Tax Code, 25 8
which authorizes property tax rate rollback elections for taxing units other
than school districts, is unconstitutional insofar as the statute applies to
counties. 259 The court reasoned that the legislation was contrary to the con-
stitutional provision authorizing commissioners courts to set tax rates and
providing that such rates are to remain in effect for the entire taxable
year. 260 In response to the taxpayer's argument that the rollback statute as
it applied to counties was a constitutional legislative enactment, the court
stated that the constitution did not authorize the legislature to delegate its
legislative power directly to the people; rather, the taxpayer's representatives
must exercise such power. 2 6 1 Because the legislature could not delegate its
constitutional powers directly to the people by allowing a direct election, it
could not delegate to the people those powers conferred by the constitution
on other governmental bodies, such as the commissioners court, by direct
election. 262
The Attorney General issued two opinions on the constitutionality of
property tax rollback elections. These opinions followed a 1987 Attorney
General opinion 2 6 3 declaring, for reasons similar to those in Vinson, section
26.07 of the Tax Code unconstitutional insofar as it applied to counties. 264
In opinions JM-8352 65 and JM-859, 266 the Attorney General held that prop-
erty tax rollback elections for school districts and hospital districts, respec-
tively, were constitutional. According to the Attorney General, the Texas
Constitution does not directly authorize either school districts or hospital
districts to set tax rates; thus, the Legislature could delegate that responsibil-
ity to the voters in those districts. The Attorney General distinguished these
facts from those regarding rollback elections for counties because the consti-
tution did directly authorize the commissioners courts to set tax rates.
267
was amended in 1987. See Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 457, § 13, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Service
4060 (Vernon); Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 947, § 9, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Service 6360 (Vernon).
258. 755 S.W.2d at 484.
259. Id. The court of appeals cites Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-792 (1987) in holding that
§ 26.07 of the Tax Code is unconstitutional as applied to counties. See infra note 263 and
accompanying text.
260. 755 S.W.2d 485-86.
261. Id. In Winborne v. Commissioners Court of Ellis County, 757 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1988, writ granted), the Waco Court of Appeals disagreed with the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals and held that rollback elections under Section 26.07 of the Tax Code were
not unconstitutional. The court found no express or implied prohibition in the constitution
against voters holding an election to reject a commissioners court tax ruling. Id. at 879. The
conflict between Winborne and Vinson should be resolved by the Texas Supreme Court.
262. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-792 (1987).
263. Id.
264. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-835 (1987).
265. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-859 (1988).
266. The Attorney General stated that the Texas Constitution conferred "explicit author-
ity" on the commissioners court to set rates and levy taxes. Id. He concluded that the taxing
power of school districts, however, was subject to the legislature's power to enact laws setting
rates. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-833 (1988). This same rationale was applied in opinion
JM-859.




The Dallas court of appeals in Dallas County Appraisal District v. The
Leaves, Inc.2 68 held that a Christian Science nursing home should not be
denied its property tax exemption merely because a majority of its patients
were able to pay for their care, the home preferred Christian Scientists as
patients, and the home practiced only Christian Science healing methods. 269
In determining whether the nursing home provided services without regard
to the beneficiaries' ability to pay, the court stated that reliance upon the
percentage of patients which are able to pay for their own care should not be
the controlling factor; rather, the total operation of the organization must be
examined. 270 In this case, although the nursing home's benevolence fund
paid less than two percent of patient charges, the home operated at a four-
teen percent loss during the year in question. The taxpayer therefore effec-
tively subsidized fourteen percent of total patient care costs. 271 Based on the
overall operations of the nursing home, the court concluded that it provided
services without regard to the patients' ability to pay. 27 2 The court also
stated that although the home preferred Christian Scientists as patients, suf-
ficient evidence existed in the record, such as the nursing home's policy to
admit all patients for whom room existed, to support the district court's
judgment that the nursing home operated as a purely public charity. 273
Several noteworthy decisions by the Texas courts of appeals addressed the
qualified open-space land exemption. In Riess v. Appraisal District of Wil-
liamson County2 7 4 the Austin court of appeals held that a taxpayer, in at-
tempting to establish that land was qualified open-space land, need not prove
that the land was used to the "degree of intensity generally accepted in the
area"2 75 during past years in order to prove that the land was historically
devoted principally to agricultural use.2 76 Instead the taxpayer must only
268. Id. at 429. See City of Austin v. University Christian Church, No. C-6294 (Tex.
1988) (not yet reported) (holding that church parking lot used on weekdays for commercial
purposes may be exempt). See also El Paso Central Appraisal Dist. v. The Evangelical Lu-
theran Good Samaritan Soc'y Inc., No. 08-87-00251-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso Oct. 26, 1988,
no writ) (not yet reported). In this case, the El Paso court of appeals held that a non-profit
corporation that operated an apartment complex for retired people who do not need immediate
medical care and a nursing home for those who need immediate medical care is entitled to tax-
exempt status as to all of its operations even though the society engages in other benevolent
work besides the activities specified in section 11. 18(c) of the Tax Code. Id.
269. 742 S.W.2d at 427-28.
270. Id. at 427.
271. Id. at 429.
272. Id. The court noted that even if the nursing home were to discriminate on the basis of
religion, such fact would not be a sufficient basis to prevent the home from qualifying as a
purely public charity. Id. The requirement that an organization be a purely public charity
was never meant to require that a charity cannot limit its care to those "belonging to a certain
sect or fraternal order, or color, or class." Id. at 429, quoting City of Houston v. Scottish Rite
Benevolence Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 199, 230 S.W. 978, 981 (1921).
273. 735 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
274. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Effective January 1, 1988,
the Texas Legislature expanded the definition of qualified open-space land by including in the
definition land historically used for timber or forest products. Id.




satisfy the "intensity of use" standard for the current year. 27 7 Therefore,
although the taxpayer's agricultural production was negligible in some past
years, he nonetheless satisfied the historical use test because the land was
still devoted principally to agricultural use during those years.2 78
The Houston (14th District) court of appeals held in Peil v. Waller County
Appraisal District27 9 that the chief appraiser of an appraisal district could
require new applications for land previously appraised as qualified open-
space land without making individual determinations that each specific par-
cel of land subject to the new application requirement was no longer eligible
for the exemption. 280 Section 23.54(e) of the Tax Code281 provides that the
chief appraiser may require owners of land previously appraised as open-
space land to file new applications to confirm that the land is currently eligi-
ble if he has good cause to believe that the land's eligibility for such exemp-
tion has ended.28 2 The chief appraiser's belief that the taxpayer's property
may have ceased to qualify as open-space land because the land is located in
an area of frequent change in use was sufficient justification to require a new
exemption application. 283
The San Antonio court of appeals held in Bower v. Edwards County Ap-
praisal District 284 that a taxpayer was not entitled to a special appraisal for
agricultural use where the sole use of the land was for wild deer hunting. 28 5
The State Property Tax Board's Guidelines286 for the valuation of agricul-
tural land clearly excluded the taxpayer's deer raising activities from the
definition of agricultural use, but the taxpayer contended that the Guidelines
exceeded the Property Tax Board's rulemaking authority.287 The court re-
sponded that rules based on a grant of legislative power must be upheld if
reasonable, and the rules at issue met this test.28 8
The voters passed three proposed constitutional amendments relating to
property taxation placed on the November 1987 election ballot, all of which
related to exemptions. These amendments (1) authorize the legislature to
exempt all personal property not otherwise exempted from the Texas Consti-
tution except personal property used as a residential dwelling or used for the
production of income,28 9 (2) limit the property taxes that the legislature may
277. The administrative rule applying the "intensity of use" standard in determining
whether land was historically devoted principally to agricultural use was held to be invalid.
Id. at 638.
278. 737 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
279. Id. at 35-36.
280. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.54(e) (Vernon 1982).
281. Id.
282. 737 S.W.2d at 35.
283. Id.
284. 752 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ granted).
285. Id. at 631.
286. The Manual for the Appraisal of Agricultural Land was amended by the State Prop-
erty Tax Board in June 1988.
287. 752 S.W.2d at 632.
288. Id. at 633.
289. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). The exemption by the legislature of all other tangible
personal property except residential dwellings and property used for the production of income,
however, may be vetoed by local government bodies. Id.
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impose on the residence homestead of the surviving spouse of an elderly
person,290 and (3) authorize the legislature to exempt certain idle mobile
marine equipment, which the legislature has already done.29 1
An Attorney General opinion 29 2 held that the local option exemption for
non-income producing boats enacted by the 70th Texas Legislature, 293 effec-
tive on May 26, 1987, was not applicable to such boats for the 1988 tax year
in taxing jurisdictions that had certified their tax rolls before May 26,
1987.294 The Attorney General reasoned that if the exemption were applied
to all applicable boats which were already on the tax rolls on the effective
date of the statute, the exemption would violate the Texas Constitution be-
cause the constitution prohibits the state from applying an exemption retro-
actively to a liability that has already matured 295 and prohibits the state




Texas courts generally continued to interpret strictly the procedural re-
quirements for property tax controversies. In Parr v. State297 the San
Antonio court of appeals held that a delinquent tax roll could not be consid-
ered as prima facie evidence of the taking unit's cause of action for delin-
quent taxes because the description of property in the tax roll was
insufficient to identify and locate the property. 298 Section 33.47 of the Tax
Code299 provides that delinquent tax records constitute prima facie evidence
of the correct amount of taxes due by the defendant. 3° ° In order for a de-
scription to be sufficient, it must identify and locate the property.30 ' The
delinquent tax roll described the property only by abstract number, name of
original grantee or addition and number of acres sought to be taxed, i.e.,
1000 acres in Abstract 227. In this case, the tax roll was defective because
the specific acres could not be located in the abstract. 30 2
In Dallas County Appraisal District v. Institute for Aerobics Research 303
290. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(d).
291. TEX. CONST. art, VIII, § 1-i. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.271 (Vernon Supp.
1988) (implementing constitutional amendment).
292. Op. Att'y Gen. No. JM-893 (1988).
293. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.14 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
294. Op. Att'y Gen. No. JM-893 (1988).
295. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 55.
296. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51.
297. 743 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
298. Id. at 270.
299. Parr actually interpreted TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7326 (repealed Jan. 1,
1982). This statute was repealed in 1982 and was codified in section 33.47 of the Tax Code.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.47 (Vernon 1982 and Supp. 1988).
300. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.47 (Vernon 1982 and Supp. 1988).
301. See Electra Indep. School District v. W.T. Waggoner Estate, 140 Tex. 483, 488, 168
S.W.2d 645, 649-650 (1943) (setting forth requirements of sufficient property description).
302. 743 S.W.2d at 270. The court held the attempted levy in this case to be invalid for
other reasons, such as the absence of some members of the commissioners court from the
meeting in which the attempted levy was made. Id. at 271.
303. 751 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1988).
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the Texas Supreme Court held that appraisal districts need not file an appeal
bond under section 42.28 of the Tax Code3°4 to appeal a district court deci-
sion.305 Section 42.28 of the Tax Code exempts the chief appraiser, the
county, the State Property Tax Board and the commissioners court from
posting an appeal bond in appealing the final judgment of the district
court.306 A divided Texas Supreme Court ruled that the county exemption
implicitly exempts the appraisal district because the appraisal district is a
governmental agent of the county for purposes of appraising property for ad
valorem taxation. 30 7
In a case in which a taxing authority was caught by the strict interpreta-
tion of the procedural requirements for a property tax controversy, the East-
land court of appeals in First Union Real Estate Investments v. Taylor
County Appraisal District30 8 held that a taxpayer who names an agent to
handle its property tax protest in a fiduciary letter of authorization sent to
the appraisal review board, but does not expressly state that such agent is to
receive all notices from the taxing authority, does not receive notification
from the taxing authority regarding notice of denial that was sent only to the
taxpayer's agent.30 9 The taxpayer did not enter a checkmark in front of the
paragraph on the fiduciary letter of authorization that asked the board to
send to the agent all assessment notices and tax statements relative to the
land involved but did check the box in front of the paragraph stating that the
agent had full authority to handle the assessment. The paragraph checked
further stated that the board was to "divulge to [the agent] any and all infor-
mation which we have submitted to you." ' 310 The court ruled that the tax-
payer's limit on the agent's authority was communicated to the board by not
checking the appropriate square. 311
IV. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
The "administrative services tax" imposed on third party administrators
304. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.28 (Vernon 1982).
305. Id. at 861-62. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Dallas court of appeals. For a
discussion of the Dallas court of appeals' decision see Ohlenforst & Dorrill, Annual Survey of
Texas Law: Taxation, 42 Sw. L.J. 633, 655 (1988). Four justices dissented in the supreme
court decision. See 751 S.W.2d at 862-63.
306. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.28 (Vernon 1982).
307. 751 S.W.2d at 861. The governmental agency of an entity excused from filing an
appeal bond is itself excused from filing such bond. Id. See also El Paso Cent. Appraisal Dist.
v, Montrose Partners, 754 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied) ("When a
governmental entity is exempt from filing an appeal bond, its governmental board is also
exempt.").
308. 758 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
309. Id. at 381.
310. Id. at 382.
311. Id. at 383. In a case related to Texas property taxes, the Austin Court of Appeals held
in Kirby v. Edgewood I.S.D., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ), that
the present school financing system in Texas is not in violation of the Texas Constitution and
reversed the judgment of the Texas district court, which held that the current state system of
funding discriminates against low-wealth school districts. The petitioners have filed an appli-
cation for writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court.
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of welfare benefit plans312 has given rise to numerous suits challenging the
constitutionality of the tax.3 13 These suits focus not only on substantive is-
sues regarding preemption of the Texas tax by federal law, 314 but also on
procedural issues regarding whether suit lies in federal or state court. 315
These cases also focus on the ability of taxpayers to force the state to refund
amounts paid in the event the tax is held unconstitutional. 31 6 Although this
tax is technically part of the Texas Insurance Code, many of the issues raised
by these cases are of critical importance to Texas state taxes. Other suits
have been filed to challenge the constitutionality of the licensing fee imposed
on third party administrators. 31 7 Unfortunately, resolving the issues raised
by these cases is likely to be a long, difficult process.
The Select Committee on Tax Equity released written conclusions at the
end of the survey period.3 18 The Committee's conclusions comprise separate
reports from each of four subcommittees: the Income Tax and Lottery
Working Group, the Business Tax Working Group, the Local Issues Work-
ing Group, and the Sales and Excise Tax Working Group. The Committee
focused on both policy matters and practical suggestions, and it proposed
several approaches to long-term reform of the Texas tax system in general,
and of the franchise tax in particular. The recommendations of the Commit-
tee and the actions of the 1989 legislature ensure that the upcoming survey
period will reflect additional changes in Texas taxation.
312. This tax is technically part of the Texas Insurance Code. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
4.1 IA (Vernon Supp. 1988).
313. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. [Doyce R.] Lee, CA No. A-88-CA-186 (W.D.
Tex.) and McDonald's Corp. v. [Doyce R.] Lee, CA No. 442,014 (14th Dist. Court Travis
County).
314. The tax appears to be pre-empted, at least to some extent, by Section 514(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (ERISA).
315. The majority of the suits filed during the survey period were filed in state district
court. E.g., McDonald's Corp., supra note 314.
316. The ability of a state to refuse to refund taxes in this circumstance has been the subject
of litigation in many other forums as well. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2810, 97 L.
Ed.2d 199 (1987); National Can Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 749 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Wash. 1988).
317. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear two cases involving
taxpayers' right to refunds of state taxes that were held unconstitutional. McKesson Corp. v.
Florida, 109 S. Ct. 389, 102 L. Ed.2d 378 (1988); American Trucking Ass'n Inc. v. Smith, 109
S. Ct. 389, 102 L. Ed.2d 378 (1988).
318. The legislature authorized this committee to study and make recommendations as to
major state and local tax issues. Act of Mar. 30, 1987, ch. 10, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 52
(Vernon).
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